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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
planned to settle in Louisiana after discharge, but was held not
to be a domiciliary anyway, since he owned no property here,
belonged to no church or civic club, and had in general per-
formed no acts indicating an intention to make Louisiana his
domicile. In Fresolone the serviceman who testified he intended
to retire here was also held not to be a domiciliary, since he
had never lived outside his army post, and did not have a car
registered here.
According to Kinchen v. Kinchen42 the defendant in a divorce
action may, according to the terms of Code of Civil Procedure
article 1061, reconvene for divorce on any grounds. This had
not been so under Code of Practice article 363; the court re-
jected cases decided under that article.
In Broussard v. Domingue48 the trial court's judgment of
separation cast against a husband domiciled in another state
was upheld by the court of appeal, but its award of alimony
pendente lite was annulled. It was held to be a money judgment
and hence unobtainable through service of process on an attor-
ney at law unless the absent defendant were actually domiciled
within the state.4 4
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
CLASSIFICATION
Public Property
According to the Civil Code classification, public property
comprises two kinds of things: (a) those which belong to a pub-
lic body and are not susceptible of private ownership, and (b)
those which belong to a public body but are susceptible of pri-
vate ownership.1  The authority for the distinction is in the
42. 147 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
43. 146 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
44. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE art. 6 (1960) : "Jurisdiction over the per-
son % the legal power and authority of the court to render a Dersonal judgment
against a party to an action or proceeding. This jurisdiction must be based
upon: . . . (2) The service of process on the attorney at law appointed by the
court to defend an action or proceeding brought against an absent or incompetent
defendant who is domiciled in this state. . ....
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450-458 (1870).
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legislative enactment based on historical sources and for the rea-
son that the former (res publicae) are things committed to a
public purpose while the latter (res fisci) are not so committed
by their nature although owned by a public body. Streets and
highways are res publicae, but ordinary public-owned lands are
res fisci. The importance of this classification was an issue in
the case of Klause v. State of Louisiana through the Department
of Highways.2
The Highway Commission acquired four lots (28, 29, 57, 58)
from a homestead association and used lots 28 and 29, except a
five-foot strip, in the construction of a highway. As the succes-
sor agency, the Department of Highways leased the remainder
to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety to be used as a
State Police Troop Headquarters. Ten years later, all four lots
formed the subject of a sheriff's sale3 from the state to Mr.
Klause, who instituted the present suit to confirm his title to
those parts of his purchase which were not incorporated into the
highway. The court of appeal held 4 that Klause's pretended title
was a nullity because in effect the property was res publica
and not susceptible of private ownership; this was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
The dispute centered only on those parts of the property
which had not been used for the highway and which had been
leased to another state agency; and it was a fact that Klause
had knowledge of an earlier tax adjudication to the state about
which the Register of the State Land Office did not know. On
account of this error, there was no legal consent, thereby mak-
ing the patent to Klause a nullity.
Insofar as the property classification is concerned, the sig-
nificant position of the majority was to treat all four lots as one
entire whole acquired by the Highway Commission for highway
purposes, and refusing to separate the part actually used as such
from the other part which was leased to another state agency.3
Since the classification is predicated upon the Highway Com-
mission's acquisition having been for highway purposes, the
lease of the parts not so used might just as well have been to a
private corporation as to a public agency. This would be much
more difficult to accept. Even on the actual facts, there were
2. 243 La. 242, 142 So. 2d 410 (1962).
3. Under LA. R.S. 47:2189 (1950).
4. 135 So. 2d 580, and 135 So. 2d 583 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
5. 243 La. at 255, 142 So. 2d at 415.
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two short but pointed dissents with reference to the leased prop-
erty; and one concurring opinion which considered the property
leased to the Department of Public Safety as a "public place"
under the seldom cited last phrase of Civil Code article 482.
The classification of all the four lots as res publicae by rea-
son of a single purchase, when less than two were actually used
for highway purposes, is fraught with dangerous possibilities
against the basic policies of protecting private ownership and
keeping property in commerce.
Common Things
Common things are defined as those which are not suscep-
tible of any ownership, neither public nor private, and among
the illustrations given in the Civil Code6 are the sea and its
shores. By enlarging the sea to include an "arm of the sea," and
by judicial legislation over the years, the shores of Lake Pont-
chartrain have been kept out of private ownership. Now, with
the aid of the Louisiana courts, the oceans are being further en-
larged. In the case of D'Albora v. Garcia,7 the court of appeal
held, and the Supreme Court presumably agreed, 8 that a canal
attached to Lake Pontchartrain is also an arm of the sea. The
canal was dug as a borrow pit in the construction of a highway,
and became the access to the lake for properties located along
its length of about 2,000 feet. The canal is sixty feet wide and
four to five feet deep. One can hardly criticize the result of the
decision, which was to prevent the proprietor at the mouth of
the canal from obstructing its use by the others, but it takes a
little while to get accustomed to the idea of a borrow pit canal
being an arm of the sea.
SERVITUDES
Natural Servitudes
The servitudes which originate from the natural situation of
the places, whereby the lower estate must receive the waters
from an upper estate, and whereby the upper estate which uses
running water must return it to its ordinary channel as it goes
to the lower estate,9 are exclusively applicable to surface waters
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 450 (1870).
7. 144 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
8. Writ denied.
9. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 660, 661 (1870) ; LA. R.S. 38:218 (1950).
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and do not apply to subsurface waters. This was the holding
of the court of appeal in the case of Adams v. Grigsby,' and it
was approved by the Supreme Court." The issue presented was
res nova, and the decision is a very important one. Defendant
was an oil operator using fresh water from a subsurface reser-
voir in such quantities as to endanger the supply for the plain-
tiff's needs through individual water wells. The court stated
that water is a liquid mineral and, by analogy, subterranean wa-
ters must be classified with oil and gas as fugitive substances.
Accordingly, ownership is acquired only upon reducing the wa-
ter to possession; the matters of regulation and control of the
water supply and use are for the legislature. Since there is
presently no statutory regulation, the court could not limit the
defendant's activity and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
suit. In so doing, the court indicated that there could conceiv-
ably be responsibility under Civil Code articles 667 and 2315,
and until the legislature fills the gap, it may well be that future
litigation under these articles will supplement the present hold-
ing as to ownership with more specific rules concerning reason-
ableness of use.
Legal Servitudes
An unusual aspect of legal servitudes was the basis of de-
cision in the case of City of New Orleans and Audubon Park
Commission v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Or-
leans.12 The Board was extending the harbor facilities and,
claiming a legal servitude under Civil Code article 665,12a wanted
to use the Mississippi River waterfront of Audubon Park. The
city and the park commission brought suit to enjoin the board
from taking this strip of river bank. The court found that the
property belonged to the state, which had set up and authorized
the park commission to administer it. As property of the state,
there could not be a public servitude on the property in favor of
the state or its agency, the Dock Board. There cannot be a servi-
tude on a property in favor of its owner; and if there had once
10. 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
11. Writ refused, judgment correct, 244 La. 662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963).
12. 148 So. 2d 782 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), writ refused, result is correct,
244 La. 204, 151 So. 2d 493 (1963).
12a. "Servitudes imposed for the public or common utility, relate to the space
which is to be left for the public use by the adjacent proprietors on the shores
of navigable rivers, and for the making and repairing of levees, roads and other
public or common works.
"All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined by laws or particular
regulations."
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been such a servitude when this was private property, it had
been extinguished by confusion when the state acquired owner-
ship of the park property. An owner can make such dispositions
as he pleases, and in this instance it would have to be done by
legislative action.
An interesting point is made in the concurring opinion of
Judge Yarrut that Civil Code articles 664 and 665 refer to pub-
lic servitudes on private lands, and that one governmental agen-
cy cannot have any right of servitude or expropriation over pub-
lic property already dedicated to a public purpose and entrusted
to another governmental agency without a constitutional or
legislative authorization.' s
The same problem, or what looked like the same problem,
came up again in connection with the property adjacent to the
park and known as the Mengel Tract in the case of Audubon
Park Commission and Audubon Park Natatorium, Inc. v. Board
of Commissioners for the Port of New Orleans.4 However, in
this case, the plaintiff's suit for an injunction against the Dock
Board was unsuccessful, because the court found that the record
ownership of the property in question was in the Natatorium,
which was a de facto private corporation. Although all the stock
of this corporation was owned by the park commission, a state
agency, the Natatorium had been organized under the laws re-
lating to private business corporations. The park commission
may have exceeded the scope of its authority in setting up the
natatorium as a separate entity, but it functioned as a de facto
private corporation, and it was the record owner of the property
in question. Accordingly, it was held that there was a public
servitude which the Dock Board could exercise for the purpose
of harbor facilities.
A legal servitude which is not often litigated is the one
which pertains to common fences. Therefore, the case of (Avrill,
widow of) Jones v. Fortenberry15 is significant. Plaintiff
claimed from defendant one-half the cost of a fence erected on
the dividing line between their properties. Defendant disclaimed
liability because his lot is not entirely enclosed, on the authority
of Civil Code article 687. The court rendered judgment for the
plaintiff on the authority of article 686, which, it held, applies
13. 148 So. 2d at 787.
14. 153 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ denied, 244 La. 1011, 156
So.2d 223 (1963).
15. 142 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), writ denied.
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to urban and suburban residential areas while article 687 applies
to rural estates. This is not any more than the articles them-
selves state, but since the provisions are so little litigated, it
may be useful to have the details spelled out and the policies
rationalized.
Conventional Servitudes
In Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Hebert,16 there had been a sale of
land in which the vendor made the reservation "less right of
way for canal and public road." The dispute centered on the
question of whether this created a servitude or whether it was
a reservation of the ownership of the land underlying the canal
and the road. The real concern was the right to the oil royalties
due to the owner of that area of land. Considering the use of
the phrase "right of way" and in the light of the deed as a
whole, the court concluded that the reservation was only a servi-
tude so that ownership passed to the vendee along with the rest
of the property. On this score of getting at the intent of the
parties, as expressed in the deed, the decision is clear and prop-
er. However, it is not so easy to understand why Louisiana
courts resort to common law terminology in order to emphasize
civil law property concepts. To distinguish "ownership" from
"servitude," the phrase "fee title" is used and italicized in the
opinion. It is bad enough for the only published report of this
case to appear under the publisher's key number headnotes of
"Easements" without compounding the distraction in the body
of the opinion. Even in the absence of a deliberate intent to
pour the Louisiana civil law into a common law mold, bypassing
the constitutional injunction 7 against doing this very thing, the
continual use of common law terms and concepts must inevitably
lead in that direction.
In James v. Buchert,8 a conventional servitude of passage
was established on one property for pedestrian and vehicular
access to another property. A subsequent owner of the servient
estate put up a fence with a gate so that the passage continued
to be used only for pedestrian passage. The question was
whether the servitude had been lost by reason of the obstruct-
ing fence or by the later construction of a carport on the strip
of land in question. The court held that the servitude had not
16. 146 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writ refused, no error of law,
243 La. 1004, 149 So. 2d 763 (1963).
17. LA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
18. 144 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
1964]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
been extinguished because the owner of the dominant estate had
not consented to the erection of the fence or the construction of
the carport. The trial court had held the servitude extinguished
on the basis of Civil Code article 784, and on this point the court
of appeal reversed, citing as authority the 1858 case of Laville-
beuvre v. Cosgrove.19
It is submitted that there are some points of analysis which
were not treated very clearly. The Lavillebeuvre case, from
which the language of decision was paraphrased, referred to ar-
ticle 816 of the Civil Code of 1825 (article 820 in the Code of
1870) in the statement that consent is necessary, and this ar-
ticle deals with the mode of extinguishing servitudes by renun-
ciation; it is therefore not appropriate for a situation which in-
volves a question of extinction by obstruction.
To begin with, the trial court's use of Civil Code article 784
was altogether inappropriate because this article deals with the
extinction of servitudes by the destruction or physical change in
the servient property.
The Louisiana codifiers were very systematic in the drafting
of the section on "How Servitudes Are Extinguished." The first
provision in article 783 is a numbered list of seven ways in which
servitudes are extinguished, and then each of these is elaborated
seriatim in the following articles. The first method of extin-
guishing servitudes is listed as "destruction" or such change of
the servient property that the servitude cannot be used (article
783, par. 1). This mode of extinction is elaborated and discussed
in articles 784-788. The second is prescription for non-use (ar-
ticle 783, par. 2), and this is discussed in articles 789-804. And
so forth. 2 )
"Obstruction" to the use of a servitude is not a direct method
of extinguishing it, but is treated in the Code as a means of
causing non-use21 which will in due time bring about its extinc-
tion by prescription.
Failure to observe the classification on which the codifiers
organized the Civil Code provisions results in the misapplication
of rules to situations for which they were not intended. In the
case of Dufilho v. Bordelon,22 Judge O'Niell spoke for the Su-
19. 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858).
20. See full enumeration and discussion in Dufilho v. Bordelon, 152 La. 88,
92 So. 744 (1922).
21. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 790-792 (1870).
22. Supra note 20.
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preme Court in reasserting this proposition and in holding that
articles 784 and 785 could not be used for a situation which in-
volved the extinction of a servitude by confusion.
Returning to the principal case (James v. Buchert) under
discussion, it may be noted that the court also dismissed the con-
tention of prescription for non-use because there had been con-
stant use of the pedestrian passage, and less than ten years non-
use of vehicular passage. If there had been ten years non-use of
the latter, this aspect of the servitude would have been extin-
guished2 8 without losing the former.
The net result of these comments is that the court of appeal's
decision was correct, in that there had been no showing of any
extinction of a properly-created conventional servitude, but the
inappropriateness of some of the arguments and the supporting
reasons should be noted in order to avoid their repetition or
their extension to still other situations.
In passing, one final observation about this case is that it
illustrates what appears to be a less-known exception to the well-
known general rule that if there is a discrepancy between the
description in a deed and the drawing on an accompanying map,
the latter controls. In the present case, the map contained an
obvious and meaningless error; when the map discrepancy
amounts to an error and is something not intended by the par-
ties because of a lack of consent it is not within the scope of
these comments.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
In the case of Community Builders, Inc. v. Scarborough,24 a
tract of land had been developed as a subdivision, including a
few commercial lots as well as the residential ones. Among the
issues concerning the properly-established building restrictions,
the most serious one required the commercial lots to have off-
street parking facilities equal to twice the square footage of the
building floor space. In the present case, the parking area was
less than one-third of the building floor space. Despite this dis-
crepancy, the trial judge held that the purpose of the require-
ment had been satisfied because there was adequate off-street
parking for all the customers who might be there at any one
time, thereby complying with the substance and intent of the
covenant although not with its letter. On this point, the court
23. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 790, 798 (1870).
24. 149 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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of appeal reversed and held that there was a violation of the
covenant because the purpose of the restriction was not only to
prevent cars from parking on the streets and the incidental
noises, and so forth, but also to limit the size of the commercial
buildings so as to preclude those businesses which need very
large or numerous buildings.
While disposing of the immediate litigation, the opinion of
the court of appeal does not clarify the penetrating issue raised
by the trial judge as to whether the court may disregard the
clear language of a properly-established building restriction
under the pretext of enforcing the substance and intent which
the court distills out of the document. The court of appeal's tech-
nique might argue for the affirmative; their holding could be
argued the other way. How far is it necessary for real estate
developers to go into details of intent when they set up new
subdivisions?
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
Succession of Butler' involved the validity of a revocatory
act in the form of a testament which was offered for probate
as the statutory will of the decedent. The act was attacked on
the grounds (1) that the formalities prescribed by the statute
had not been complied with, not having been signed by the testa-
trix who had merely affixed her mark, and (2) that the testatrix
was precluded from making a statutory will because she could
not read.2 The instrument in question had been executed before
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 152 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 244 La. 668, 153 So. 2d
153 (1963).
2. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1962): "In addition to the methods provided in
the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid if in writing (whether typewritten,
printed, mimeographed, or written in any other manner), and signed by the
testator in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses in the following
manner:
"(1) Testator. In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator
shall signify to them that the instrument is his will and shall sign each separate
sheet of the instrument.
"(2) Notary public and witnesses. The notary and both witnesses must sign
at the end of the will
"(a) In the presence of the testator, and
"(b) In the presence of each other.
"(3) The foregoing facts shall be evidenced in writing above the signatures
of the notary public and witnesses and the testator at the end of the will. Such
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